Title
Verifiable auctions for online ad exchanges
Abstract
This paper treats a critical component of the Web ecosystem that has so far received little attention in our community: ad exchanges. Ad exchanges run auctions to sell publishers' inventory-space on Web pages-to advertisers who want to display ads in those spaces. Unfortunately, under the status quo, the parties to an auction cannot check that the auction was carried out correctly, which raises the following more general question: how can we create verifiability in low-latency, high-frequency auctions where the parties do not know each other? We address this question with the design, prototype implementation, and experimental evaluation of VEX. VEX introduces a technique for efficient, privacy-preserving integer comparisons; couples these with careful protocol design; and adds little latency and tolerable overhead.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1145/2486001.2486038
SIGCOMM
Keywords
Field
DocType
high-frequency auction,integer comparison,critical component,online ad exchange,experimental evaluation,ad exchange,prototype implementation,web ecosystem,web pages-to advertiser,verifiable auction,general question,careful protocol design,online advertising
Internet privacy,Status quo,Computer security,Computer science,Online advertising,Verifiable secret sharing,Common value auction,Protocol design
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISSN
43
4
0146-4833
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
9
0.53
29
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Sebastian Angel1318.25
Michael Walfish2100769.58