Title
Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rules for Combinatorial Auctions
Abstract
We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe. Specifically, we compute a unique point in the core that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from a reference point, for example, from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties. Furthermore, we discuss the benefits of this combinatorial auction, explore the use of alternative reserve pricing approaches in this context, and indicate the results of several hundred computational runs using CATS data.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1287/opre.1110.1024
Operations Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
quadratic core-selecting payment rules,combinatorial auctions,equitable penalty,quadratic programming technique,unique point,reference point,vickrey-clarke-groves payment,hundred computational,combinatorial auction,cats data,alternative reserve pricing approach,karush-kuhn-tucker condition,spectrum auctions,auctions,market design
Mathematical optimization,Economics,Vickrey auction,Unique bid auction,Combinatorial auction,Microeconomics,Auction theory,Common value auction,Quadratic programming,Spectrum auction,Forward auction
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
60
3
0030-364X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
19
1.29
10
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Robert Day119315.90
Peter Cramton225525.93