Abstract | ||
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A variant of Mobile Ambient Calculus is introduced, called Boundary Ambient, to model multilevel security policies. Ambients that may guarantee to properly protect their content are explicitly identified as boundaries: a boundary can be seen as a resource access manager for confidential data. In this setting, we define a notion of non-interference which captures the absence of any (both direct and indirect) information leakage. Then, we guarantee non-interference by extending a control flow analysis that computes an over approximation of all ambients and capabilities that may be affected by the actual values of high level data. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2003 | 10.1016/S1571-0661(04)81010-7 | Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Information flow (information theory),Information leakage,Confidentiality,Computer science,Multilevel security,Theoretical computer science,Access control,Control flow analysis,Ambient calculus,Distributed computing | Journal | 78 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
1571-0661 | 2 | 0.38 |
References | Authors | |
18 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Chiara Braghin | 1 | 105 | 8.86 |
Agostino Cortesi | 2 | 791 | 66.19 |
Riccardo Focardi | 3 | 1229 | 99.99 |