Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The RSA-based Password-Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) protocols have been proposed to realize both mutual authentication and generation of secure session keys where a client is sharing his/her password only with a server and the latter should generate its RSA public/private key pair (e, n), (d, n) every time due to the lack of PKI (Public-Key Infrastructures). One of the ways to avoid a special kind of off-line (so called e-residue) attacks in the RSA-based PAKE protocols is to deploy a challenge/response method by which a client verifies the relative primality of e and φ(n) interactively with a server. However, this kind of RSA-based PAKE protocols did not give any proof of the underlying challenge/response method and therefore could not specify the exact complexity of their protocols since there exists another security parameter, needed in the challenge/response method. In this paper, we first present an RSA-based PAKE (RSA-PAKE) protocol that can deploy two different challenge/response methods (denoted by Challenge/Response Method1 and Challenge/Response Method2). The main contributions of this work include: (1) Based on the number theory, we prove that the Challenge/Response Method1 and the Challenge/Response Method2 are secure against e-residue attacks for any odd prime e; (2) With the security parameter for the on-line attacks, we show that the RSA-PAKE protocol is provably secure in the random oracle model where all of the off-line attacks are not more efficient than on-line dictionary attacks; and (3) By considering the Hamming weight of e and its complexity in the RSA-PAKE protocol, we search for primes to be recommended for a practical use. We also compare the RSA-PAKE protocol with the previous ones mainly in terms of computation and communication complexities. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1093/ietisy/e91-d.5.1424 | IEICE Transactions |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
rsa-based password-authenticated key exchange,underlying challenge,different challenge,response method1,response method2,rsa-pake protocol,rsa-based pake,response method,security parameter,rsa-based pake protocol,communication complexity,public key infrastructure,random oracle model,dictionary attack,provable security,password authentication,key exchange,hamming weight,number theory | Dictionary attack,Key exchange,Computer science,Computer security,Authenticated Key Exchange,Random oracle,Password,Security parameter,Public-key cryptography,Provable security | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
E91-D | 5 | 0916-8532 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.36 | 10 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Seonghan Shin | 1 | 54 | 8.57 |
| kazukuni kobara | 2 | 387 | 47.00 |
| Hideki Imai | 3 | 1 | 0.36 |