Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In a setting where agents have quasi-linear utilities over social alternatives and a transferable commodity, we consider three properties that a social choice function may possess: truthful implementation (in dominant strategies); monotonicity in differences; and lexicographic affine maximization. We introduce the notion of a flexible domain of preferences that allows elevation of pairs and study which of these conditions implies which others in such domain. We provide a generalization of the theorem of Roberts (1979) [36] in restricted valuation domains. Flexibility holds (and the theorem is not vacuous) if the domain of valuation profiles is restricted to the space of continuous functions defined on a compact metric space, or the space of piecewise linear functions defined on an affine space, or the space of smooth functions defined on a compact differentiable manifold. We provide applications of our results to public goods allocation settings, with finite and infinite alternative sets. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2013 | 10.1016/j.jet.2012.11.001 | Journal of Economic Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
C72,D70,D82 | Journal | 148 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
3 | 0022-0531 | 8 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.60 | 10 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Juan Carlos Carbajal | 1 | 17 | 2.37 |
| Andrew McLennan | 2 | 40 | 5.20 |
| Rabee Tourky | 3 | 39 | 5.89 |