Paper Info
Title
Stern-Judging: A Simple, Successful Norm Which Promotes Cooperation Under Indirect Reciprocity
Abstract
We study the evolution of cooperation under indirect reciprocity, believed to constitute the biological basis of morality. We employ an evolutionary game theoretical model of multilevel selection, and show that natural selection and mutation lead to the emergence of a robust and simple social norm, which we call stern-judging. Under stern-judging, helping a good individual or refusing help to a bad individual leads to a good reputation, whereas refusing help to a good individual or helping a bad one leads to a bad reputation. Similarly for tit-for-tat and win-stay-lose-shift, the simplest ubiquitous strategies in direct reciprocity, the lack of ambiguity of stern-judging, where implacable punishment is compensated by prompt forgiving, supports the idea that simplicity is often associated with evolutionary success.
Year
DOI
Venue
2006
10.1371/journal.pcbi.0020178
PLOS COMPUTATIONAL BIOLOGY
Keywords
Field
DocType
game theory,natural selection,tit for tat,social norm,indirect reciprocity
Positive economics,Morality,Reciprocity (evolution),Biology,Norm of reciprocity,Norm (social),Reciprocity (social psychology),Game theory,Genetics,Ambiguity,Reputation
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
2
12
1553-734X
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
29
6.39
0
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Jorge M. Pacheco19124.30
Francisco C Santos211530.48
Fabio A. C. C. Chalub3347.62