Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
. We consider the framework of repeated two-person zero-sum games with lack of information on one side. We compare the equilibrium
payoffs of the informed player in two cases: where he is facing either a) a single long-lived uninformed player, or b) a sequence
of short-lived uninformed players. We show: 1) that situation b) is always (weakly) better than a), 2) that it can be strictly
better in some cases, 3) that the two cases are equivalent if the long uninformed player has an optimal strategy independent
of his own moves. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1007/s001820000045 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Key words: incomplete information,sequence of opponents | Journal | 29 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
3 | 1432-1270 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
1.86 | 0 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jean-Pierre Beaud | 1 | 1 | 1.86 |
| Sylvain Sorin | 2 | 300 | 49.48 |