Abstract | ||
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Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction properties were not correct. They also provide a proof of the IIS property, a stronger version of both iterated dominance and forward induction, using the results of that paper. In this note we provide a direct proof of the IIS property. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
---|---|---|
2004 | 10.1007/s001820400168 | Int. J. Game Theory |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Game Theory,Nash equilibrium,Stable sets,Admissibility of strategies | Mathematical economics,Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development,Mathematical proof,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Iterated function,Mathematics,Direct proof | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
32 | 3 | 0020-7276 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 1 |
Authors | ||
4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
John Hillas | 1 | 4 | 2.24 |
Mathijs Jansen | 2 | 10 | 3.21 |
Jos Potters | 3 | 40 | 7.15 |
Dries Vermeulen | 4 | 70 | 18.63 |