Title
Independence of inadmissible strategies and best reply stability: a direct proof
Abstract
Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of the iterated dominance and forward induction properties were not correct. They also provide a proof of the IIS property, a stronger version of both iterated dominance and forward induction, using the results of that paper. In this note we provide a direct proof of the IIS property.
Year
DOI
Venue
2004
10.1007/s001820400168
Int. J. Game Theory
Keywords
Field
DocType
Game Theory,Nash equilibrium,Stable sets,Admissibility of strategies
Mathematical economics,Lawrence Kohlberg's stages of moral development,Mathematical proof,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Iterated function,Mathematics,Direct proof
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
32
3
0020-7276
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
1
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
John Hillas142.24
Mathijs Jansen2103.21
Jos Potters3407.15
Dries Vermeulen47018.63