Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We present a sealed-bid electronic auction scheme that is equitably fair for the bidders and the seller. In this scheme, the interests of both the bidders and the seller are safeguarded: the identity of the non-winning bidders and their bidding behavior are protected (anonymity), and the bidders cannot withdraw their bids without being detected (non-repudiation). The scheme fulfills the requirements of a secure auction scheme and is verifiable. It extends the Stubblebine & Syverson auction scheme that is not equitably fair (it does not prevent bid withdrawals). Our scheme employs a Registar and an Auctioneer for which no special trust assumptions are made. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2000 | 10.1007/3-540-44463-7_7 | EC-Web |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
special trust assumption,secure auction scheme,non-winning bidder,sealed-bid electronic auction scheme,bid withdrawal,equitably fair on-line auction,bidding behavior,syverson auction scheme | English auction,Vickrey auction,Computer science,Computer security,Vickrey–Clarke–Groves auction,Auction theory,Verifiable secret sharing,Anonymity,Bidding,Reverse auction | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | ISBN |
1875 | 0302-9743 | 3-540-67981-2 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.35 | 22 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Emmanouil Magkos | 1 | 217 | 24.01 |
| Mike Burmester | 2 | 1125 | 98.84 |
| vassilios chrissikopoulos | 3 | 160 | 16.11 |