Title
Sufficient condition for ephemeral key-leakage resilient tripartite key exchange
Abstract
Tripartite (Diffie-Hellman) Key Exchange (3KE), introduced by Joux (ANTS-IV 2000), represents today the only known class of group key exchange protocols, in which computation of unauthenticated session keys requires one round and proceeds with minimal computation and communication overhead. The first one-round authenticated 3KE version that preserved the unique efficiency properties of the original protocol and strengthened its security towards resilience against leakage of ephemeral (session-dependent) secrets was proposed recently by Manulis, Suzuki, and Ustaoglu (ICISC 2009). In this work we explore sufficient conditions for building such protocols. We define a set of admissible polynomials and show how their construction generically implies 3KE protocols with the desired security and efficiency properties. Our result generalizes the previous 3KE protocol and gives rise to many new authenticated constructions, all of which enjoy forward secrecy and resilience to ephemeral key-leakage under the gap Bilinear Diffie-Hellman assumption in the random oracle model.
Year
DOI
Venue
2012
10.1007/978-3-642-31448-3_2
ACISP
Keywords
Field
DocType
sufficient condition,original protocol,gap bilinear diffie-hellman assumption,admissible polynomial,resilient tripartite key exchange,new authenticated construction,minimal computation,group key exchange protocol,efficiency property,communication overhead,unique efficiency property,key exchange
Psychological resilience,Authentication,Polynomial,Key exchange,Computer science,Computer security,Random oracle,Theoretical computer science,Forward secrecy,Ephemeral key,Distributed computing,Computation
Conference
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
6
0.44
33
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Atsushi Fujioka160242.75
Mark Manulis263650.11
Koutarou Suzuki351829.57
Berkant Ustaoğlu431817.02