Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Sen’s classic social choice result supposedly demonstrates a conflict between Pareto and minimal forms of liberalism. By providing
the first direct mathematical proof of this seminal result, we underscore a significantly different interpretation: rather
than conflicts among rights, Sen’s result occurs because the liberalism assumption negates the requirement that voters have
transitive preferences. This explanation enriches interpretations of Sen’s conclusion by introducing radically new kinds of
societal conflicts, by suggesting ways to sidestep these difficulties, and by providing insight into other approaches that
have been used to avoid the difficulties. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2008 | 10.1007/s00355-007-0288-2 | Social Choice and Welfare |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
social choice,decision theory,paradox | Welfare economics,Social choice theory,Mathematical economics,Economics,Mathematical proof,Decision theory,Liberalism,Pareto principle,Transitive relation | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
31 | 3 | 1432-217X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
3 | 0.95 | 1 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lingfang (Ivy) Li | 1 | 13 | 2.97 |
| DONALD G. SAARI | 2 | 99 | 29.14 |