Paper Info
Title
On weighted Kalai–Samet solutions for non-transferable utility coalitional form games
Abstract
We investigate the implications of the axiom of coalitional concavity for non-transferable utility coalitional form games. This axiom says that if the feasible set of some coalition is uncertain whereas the feasible sets of other coalitions are known, then all players in the coalition with the uncertain feasible set should (weakly) benefit from reaching a compromise before the uncertainty is resolved. By imposing this axiom, in addition to other minor axioms, we characterize the weighted Kalai–Samet [Econometrica 53 (1985) 307] solutions: these solutions coincide with the weighted egalitarian solutions on the domain of bargaining problems, and with the weighted Shapley values on the domain of transferable utility coalitional form games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2004
10.1016/S0899-8256(03)00182-9
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
NTU games,Weighted Kalai–Samet solutions,Axiomatic approach,Coalitional concavity
Welfare economics,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Economics,Axiomatic system,Axiom,Feasible region,Transferable utility,Compromise
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
47
2
0899-8256
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Youngsub Chun19420.80