Paper Info
Title
Breaking mifare DESFire MF3ICD40: power analysis and templates in the real world
Abstract
With the advent of side-channel analysis, implementations of mathematically secure ciphers face a new threat: by exploiting the physical characteristics of a device, adversaries are able to break algorithms such as AES or Triple-DES (3DES), for which no efficient analytical or brute-force attacks exist. In this paper, we demonstrate practical, noninvasive side-channel attacks on the Mifare DESFire MF3ICD40 contactless smartcard, a 3DES-based alternative to the cryptanalytically weak Mifare Classic [9,25]. We detail on how to recover the complete 112-bit secret key of the employed 3DES algorithm, using non-invasive power analysis and template attacks. Our methods can be put into practice at a low cost with standard equipment, thus posing a severe threat to many real-world applications that employ the DESFire MF3ICD40 smartcard.
Year
Venue
Keywords
2011
CHES
112-bit secret key,noninvasive side-channel attack,contactless smartcard,mifare desfire,new threat,cryptanalytically weak mifare classic,real world,severe threat,non-invasive power analysis,brute-force attack,side-channel analysis,templates
Field
DocType
Volume
Power analysis,Computer science,Computer security,Smart card,Implementation,Template
Conference
6917
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
58
2.79
References 
Authors
18
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
David Oswald124020.38
Christof Paar23794442.62