Paper Info
Title
Cryptanalysis of Ha-Moon's Countermeasure of Randomized Signed Scalar Multiplication*
Abstract
Side channel attacks (SCA) are serious attacks on mobile devices. In SCA, the attacker can observe the side channel information while the device performs the cryptographic operations, and he/she can detect the secret stored in the device using such side channel information. Ha-Moon proposed a novel countermeasure against side channel attacks in elliptic curve cryptosystems (ECC). The countermeasure is based on the signed scalar multiplication with randomized concept, and does not pay the penalty of speed. Ha-Moon proved that the countermeasure is secure against side channel attack theoretically, and confirmed its immunity experimentally. Thus Ha-Moon's countermeasure seems to be very attractive. In this paper we propose a novel attack against Ha-Moon's countermeasure, and show that the countermeasure is vulnerable to the proposed attack. The proposed attack utilizes a Markov chain for detecting the secret. The attacker determines the transitions in the Markov chain using side channel information, then detects the relation between consecutive two bits of the secret key, instead of bits of the secret key as they are. The use of such relations drastically reduces the search space for the secret key, and the attacker can easily reveal the secret. In fact, around twenty observations of execution of the countermeasure are suffcient to detect the secret in the case of the standard sizes of ECC. Therefore, the single use of Ha-Moon's countermeasure is not recommended for cryptographic use.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1093/ietfec/e88-a.5.1140
IEICE Transactions
Keywords
Field
DocType
cryptographic use,side channel attack,proposed attack,scalar multiplication,secret key,novel attack,side channel attack theoretically,novel countermeasure,markov chain,side channel information,serious attack,dpa,side channel attacks
Countermeasure,Scalar multiplication,Computer security,Cryptography,Markov chain,Cryptanalysis,Mobile device,Side channel attack,Elliptic curve cryptosystems,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
E88-A
5
0916-8508
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
0
0.34
0
Authors
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Katsuyuki Okeya144738.47
Dong-guk Han212424.94