Title
Simple Search Methods for Finding a Nash Equilibrium
Abstract
We present two simple search methods for computing a sample Nash equilibrium in a normal-form game: one for 2-player games and one for n-player games. Both algorithms bias the search towards supports that are small and balanced, and employ a backtracking procedure to efficiently explore these supports. Making use of a new comprehensive testbed, we test these algorithms on many classes of games, and show that they perform well against the state of the art - the Lemke-Howson algorithm for 2-player games, and Simplicial Subdivision and Govindan-Wilson for n-player games.
Year
DOI
Venue
2004
10.1016/j.geb.2006.03.015
Games and Economic Behavior
Keywords
Field
DocType
normal-form game,2-player game,nash equilibrium,sample nash equilibrium,lemke-howson algorithm,player game,simple search method,n-player game,algorithms,computer science,simplicial subdivision,normal form game
Combinatorial game theory,Mathematical optimization,Epsilon-equilibrium,Computer science,Best response,Repeated game,Equilibrium selection,Game theory,Nash equilibrium,Bayesian game
Conference
Volume
Issue
ISSN
63
2
0899-8256
ISBN
Citations 
PageRank 
0-262-51183-5
95
7.66
References 
Authors
12
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Ryan Porter123821.45
Eugene Nudelman250330.09
Yoav Shoham35530764.00