Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We analyze the security notion of information-theoretic secrecy against an adversary who can make C adaptive queries to the decryption oracle, and show that it is equivalent to requiring that the encryption scheme can perfectly encrypt l + 1 different messages. This immediately yields a lower bound on the key length and an optimal construction, namely (l + 1)-wise independent permutations. This also gives an operational interpretation to the notion of decryption oracles in information-theoretic security. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2011 | 10.1587/transfun.E94.A.1585 | IEICE TRANSACTIONS ON FUNDAMENTALS OF ELECTRONICS COMMUNICATIONS AND COMPUTER SCIENCES |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cryptography, information-theoretic security, encryption scheme, decryption oracle | Computer security,Cryptography,Secrecy,Permutation,Oracle,Theoretical computer science,Encryption,Information-theoretic security,Adversary,Mathematics,Key size | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
E94A | 7 | 0916-8508 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
1 | 0.37 | 6 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Christopher Portmann | 1 | 1 | 0.37 |
| Keisuke Tanaka | 2 | 278 | 19.04 |