Paper Info
Title
Theories of Truth Which Have No Standard Models
Abstract
This papers deals with the class of axiomatic theories of truth for semantically closed languages, where the theories do not allow for standard models; i.e., those theories cannot be interpreted as referring to the natural number codes of sentences only (for an overview of axiomatic theories of truth in general, see Halbach[6]). We are going to give new proofs for two well-known results in this area, and we also prove a new theorem on the nonstandardness of a certain theory of truth. The results indicate that the proof strategies for all the theorems on the nonstandardness of such theories are "essentially" of the same kind of structure.
Year
DOI
Venue
2001
10.1023/A:1011950105814
Studia Logica
Keywords
Field
DocType
axiomatic theories of truth,semantically closed languages,nonstandard models,omega-logic,McGee's omega-inconsistency result
Discrete mathematics,Natural number,Coherence theory of truth,Axiom,Algorithm,Mathematical proof,Truth function,Mathematics
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
68
1
1572-8730
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
10
1.35
4
Authors
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Hannes Leitgeb111519.26