Title
Cryptanalysis of server-aided RSA key generation protocols at MADNES 2005
Abstract
At MADNES 2005, Y. Chen et al. proposed two improved server-aided RSA key generation protocols, which are claimed to be secure against collusion attack. However, at ISPEC 2006, T. Cao et al. presented a collusion attack on Chen's standard server-aided RSA key generation protocol and can get the plaintext from a ciphertext. In this paper, we propose a full cryptanalysis of Chen's two server-aided RSA key generation protocols. Firstly, we give a further analysis of Chen's standard protocol and can recover the factorization of the RSA modulus N with the complexity O(log3(N)). Secondly, we propose two collusion attacks on Chen's unbalanced RSA key generation protocol. It is proved that we can decrypt any ciphertext with the complexity O(log3(N)) and find the secret prime p with the complexity O(log4(N)). Therefore, neither of Chen's two server-aided RSA key generation protocols can resist collusion attack.
Year
DOI
Venue
2007
10.1007/978-3-540-73547-2_8
ATC
Keywords
Field
DocType
rsa modulus n,standard protocol,collusion attack,full cryptanalysis,complexity o,unbalanced rsa key generation,secret prime p,server-aided rsa key generation
Key generation,Computer science,Cryptanalysis,Smart card,Extended Euclidean algorithm,Encryption,Theoretical computer science,Ciphertext,Plaintext,Modular exponentiation
Conference
Volume
ISSN
ISBN
4610
0302-9743
3-540-73546-1
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
1
0.35
14
Authors
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Fanyu Kong125121.83
Jia Yu247557.62
Baodong Qin319019.40
Daxing Li4609.20