Title
Solving the combinatorial double auction problem
Abstract
This paper studies the solution of several types of combinatorial (double) auctions. Such auctions have recently been used in business-to-business trading in a centralized marketplace, or in multi-agent coordination systems in artificial intelligence. When the goods are indivisible, solving the winner determination problem (WDP) is an integer programming problem and NP-hard in its general form. We show that a general combinatorial double auction can be reduced to a combinatorial single-sided auction, which is a multi-dimensional knapsack problem.
Year
DOI
Venue
2005
10.1016/j.ejor.2003.11.018
European Journal of Operational Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
Bidding-auctions,Artificial intelligence,Integer programming,Branch-and-bound,Analysis of algorithms
Mathematical optimization,Branch and bound,Combinatorial auction,Combinatorial optimization,Common value auction,Auction theory,Knapsack problem,Auction algorithm,Mathematics,Double auction
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
164
1
0377-2217
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
36
1.67
14
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Mu Xia123812.95
Jan Stallaert257273.86
Andrew B. Whinston34572552.12