Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Tor is currently one of the more popular systems for anonymizing near real-time communications on the Internet. Recently, Borisov et al. proposed a denial of service based attack on Tor (and related systems) that significantly increases the probability of compromising the anonymity provided. In this paper, we propose an algorithm for detecting such attacks and examine the effectiveness of the obvious approach to evading such detection. We implement a simplified version of the detection algorithm and study whether the attack may be in progress on the current Tor network. Our preliminary measurements indicate that the attack was probably not implemented during the period we observed the network. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2009 | 10.1007/978-3-642-03549-4_17 | Financial Cryptography |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
obvious approach,reliability,real-time communication,detecting denial,service attacks,detection.,denial of service,current tor network,popular system,anonymity,attack,detection algorithm,preliminary measurement,related system,denial of service attack,near real time | Internet privacy,Denial-of-service attack,Computer security,Computer science,Computer network,Anonymity,The Internet | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
5628 | 0302-9743 | 7 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.47 | 7 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Norman Danner | 1 | 76 | 8.05 |
| Danny Krizanc | 2 | 1778 | 191.04 |
| Marc Liberatore | 3 | 415 | 24.81 |