Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
This survey describes the approximately optimal mechanism design paradigm and uses it to investigate two basic questions in auction theory. First, when is complexity --- in the sense of detailed distributional knowledge --- an essential feature of revenue-maximizing single-item auctions? Second, do combinatorial auctions require high-dimensional bid spaces to achieve good social welfare? |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1145/2728732.2728733 | SIGecom Exchanges |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Mechanism design, auctions, approximation | Journal | 13 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 1551-9031 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.36 | 18 | 1 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tim Roughgarden | 1 | 4177 | 353.32 |