Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
The core and the Shapley value are important solution concepts in cooperative game theory. While the core is designed for the stability of the game, the Shapley value aims for fairness among the players. However, the Shapley value might not lie within the core and a core solution might not be 'fair'. We introduce a new solution concept called the 'fairest core', one that aims for both stability and fairness. We show attractive properties of the fairest core. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.1016/j.orl.2014.11.001 | Operations Research Letters |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
stability | Journal | 43 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
1 | 0167-6377 | 2 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.44 | 2 | 1 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tri-Dung Nguyen | 1 | 29 | 9.02 |