Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Opportunistic wireless channel access granted to non-licensed users through auctions represents a promising approach for effectively distributing and utilizing the scarce wireless spectrum. A limitation of existing spectrum auction designs lies in the over-simplifying assumption that every non-licensed secondary user is a single node or single-hop network. For the first time in the literature, we propose to model non-licensed users as secondary networks (SNs), each of which comprises of a multihop network with end-to-end routing demands. We use simple examples to show that such auctions among SNs differ drastically from simple auctions among single-hop users, and previous solutions suffer from local, per-hop decision making. We first design a simple, heuristic auction that takes inter-SN interference into consideration and is truthful. We then design a randomized auction framework based on primal-dual linear optimization, which is automatically truthful and achieves a social welfare approximation ratio that matches one achieved by cooperative optimization assuming truthful bids for free. The framework relieves a spectrum auction designer from worrying about truthfulness of the auction, so that he or she can focus on social welfare maximization while assuming truthful bids for free. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.1109/TMC.2013.64 | IEEE Trans. Mob. Comput. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Wireless networks,Spread spectrum management,Radio spectrum management,Linear programming | Heuristic,Mathematical optimization,Wireless,Computer science,Combinatorial auction,Communication channel,Computer network,Auction theory,Common value auction,Linear programming,Spectrum auction | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
14 | 2 | 1536-1233 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
10 | 0.56 | 13 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zongpeng Li | 1 | 2054 | 153.21 |
| Baochun Li | 2 | 9416 | 614.20 |
| Yuefei Zhu | 3 | 408 | 34.80 |