Title
Input-to-State Stabilizing Control under Denial-of-Service
Abstract
The issue of cyber-security has become ever more prevalent in the analysis and design of networked systems. In this paper, we analyze networked control systems in the presence of Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, namely attacks that prevent transmissions over the network. We characterize frequency and duration of the DoS attacks under which input-to-state stability (ISS) of the closed-loop system can be preserved. To achieve ISS, a suitable scheduling of the transmission times is determined. It is shown that the considered framework is flexible enough so as to allow the designer to choose from several implementation options that can be used for trading-off performance vs. communication resources. Examples are given to substantiate the analysis.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1109/TAC.2015.2416924
Automatic Control, IEEE Transactions  
Keywords
Field
DocType
Computer crime,Stability analysis,Process control,Closed loop systems,Jamming,Eigenvalues and eigenfunctions
Denial-of-service attack,Networked control system,Scheduling (computing),Control theory,Cyber-physical system,Process control,Control system,Engineering,Jamming,Distributed computing
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
PP
99
0018-9286
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
126
2.75
30
Authors
2
Search Limit
100126
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
de persis1108779.28
Pietro Tesi245232.00