Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We study the dynamics of multiround position auctions, considering both the case of exogenous click-through rates and the case in which click-through rates are determined by an endogenous consumer search process. In both contexts, we demonstrate that dynamic position auctions converge to their associated static, envy-free equilibria. Furthermore, convergence is efficient, and the entry of low-quality advertisers does not slow convergence. Because our approach predominantly relies on assumptions common in the sponsored search literature, our results suggest that dynamic position auctions converge more generally. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1145/2632226 | ACM Trans. Economics and Comput. |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
position auctions,theory,electronic commerce,economics,consumer search,dynamic auctions,best-response bidding,advertising | Convergence (routing),Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Best response,Common value auction | Journal |
Volume | Issue | Citations |
2 | 3 | 4 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.44 | 8 | 9 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Matthew Cary | 1 | 141 | 9.83 |
| Aparna Das | 2 | 98 | 7.66 |
| Benjamin Edelman | 3 | 210 | 22.05 |
| Ioannis Giotis | 4 | 169 | 14.10 |
| Kurtis Heimerl | 5 | 212 | 21.97 |
| Anna R. Karlin | 6 | 4429 | 646.72 |
| Scott Duke Kominers | 7 | 101 | 19.76 |
| Claire Mathieu | 8 | 452 | 25.78 |
| Michael Schwarz | 9 | 94 | 8.22 |