Title
EM Attack Is Non-invasive? - Design Methodology and Validity Verification of EM Attack Sensor
Abstract
This paper presents a standard-cell-based semi-automatic design methodology of a new conceptual countermeasure against electromagnetic EM analysis and fault-injection attacks. The countermeasure namely EM attack sensor utilizes LC oscillators which detect variations in the EM field around a cryptographic LSI caused by a micro probe brought near the LSI. A dual-coil sensor architecture with an LUT-programming-based digital calibration can prevent a variety of microprobe-based EM attacks that cannot be thwarted by conventional countermeasures. All components of the sensor core are semiautomatically designed by standard EDA tools with a fully-digital standard cell library and hence minimum design cost. This sensor can be therefore scaled together with the cryptographic LSI to be protected. The sensor prototype is designed based on the proposed methodology together with a 128bit-key composite AES processor in 0.18μm CMOS with overheads of only 2respectively. The validity against a variety of EM attack scenarios has been verified successfully.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1007/978-3-662-44709-3_1
CHES
Keywords
DocType
Volume
EM analysis attack, EM fault injection attack, countermeasure, attack detection, micro EM probe
Journal
2014
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
10
0.70
References 
Authors
13
7
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Naofumi Homma137753.81
Yu-ichi Hayashi2273.96
Noriyuki Miura330661.16
Daisuke Fujimoto4256.52
Daichi Tanaka5100.70
Makoto Nagata628576.47
Takafumi Aoki7915125.99