Paper Info
Title
Two-Stage Spectrum Sharing With Combinatorial Auction and Stackelberg Game in Recall-Based Cognitive Radio Networks
Abstract
The dynamic spectrum access (DSA) among multiple heterogeneous primary spectrum owners (POs) and secondary users (SUs) in recall-based cognitive radio networks is investigated in this paper. In our framework, SUs demand a different amount of spectrum for their transmissions. Each PO provides a portion of radio resources for leasing and also offers its own primary users (PUs) a certain degree of quality of service (QoS). Furthermore, POs are allowed to have different spectrum trading areas and as well as heterogeneous activities between POs' users. We propose a Two-stage resource allocation scheme with combinatorial Auction and Stackelberg Game in spectrum Sharing (TAGS) to deal with the allocation problem in such a complicated system. In the first stage, a spectrum allocation is decided by running a geographically restricted combinatorial auction without the consideration of spectrum recall. In the second stage, a Stackelberg game is formulated for all users to determine their best strategies with respect to the potential spectrum recall. Both theoretical and simulation results prove that TAGS provides a feasible solution for the problem and ensures the desired economic properties for all individuals.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1109/TCOMM.2014.2363116
IEEE Transactions on Communications
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Games,Resource management,Approximation algorithms,Quality of service,Pricing,Cognitive radio,Bandwidth
Journal
62
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
11
0090-6778
26
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.79
24
2
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Changyan Yi113110.96
Jun Cai237339.29