Paper Info
Title
The impact of risk attitude in new product development under dual information asymmetry.
Abstract
•Four classes of uncertain principal agent models are presented.•The closed form expressions for the optimal wage contracts are derived.•The information values of the idea and the effort are characterized.•Several interesting managerial insights are provided.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1016/j.cie.2014.07.024
Computers & Industrial Engineering
Keywords
Field
DocType
Uncertainty theory,New product development,Information asymmetry,Wage contract
Revenue,Economics,Information asymmetry,Incentive,Functional manager,Principal–agent problem,Project manager,Operations management,Wage,New product development
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
76
C
0360-8352
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
19
0.80
15
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Kai Yang11218.47
Ruiqing Zhao258846.97
Yanfei Lan321815.92