Paper Info
Title
Strategizing niceness in co-opetition: The case of knowledge exchange in supply chain innovation projects.
Abstract
In this paper, we take a novel approach to address the dilemma of innovation sharing versus protection among supply chain partners. The paper conducts an exploratory study that introduces factors affecting a firm's optimum supply chain innovation strategy. We go beyond the conventional Prisoners’ Dilemma, with its limiting assumptions of players’ preferences and symmetry, to explore a larger pool of 2 × 2 games that may effectively model the problem. After classifying firm types according to collaboration motive and relative power, we use simulation to explore the effects of firm type, opponent type, and payoff structure on repeated innovation interactions (or, equivalently, long-term relations) and optimality of ‘niceness’. Surprisingly, we find that opponent type is essentially irrelevant in long-term innovation interactions, and focal firm type is only conditionally relevant. The paper contributes further by introducing reciprocation of strategy type (nice versus mean), showing that reciprocation is recommended, while identifying and explaining the exceptions to this conclusion.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1016/j.ejor.2015.02.011
European Journal of Operational Research
Keywords
Field
DocType
Decision analysis,Simulation,Innovation,Game theory,Knowledge sharing dilemma
Decision analysis,Economics,Motif (music),Game theory,Supply chain,Dilemma,Adversary,Exploratory research,Operations management,Stochastic game
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
244
3
0377-2217
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
2
0.35
15
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Eman S. Nasr120.35
D. Marc Kilgour257170.61
Hamid Noori39717.32