Title
Historical evolution and benefit-cost explanation of periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision: An evolutionary game analysis framework.
Abstract
•Periodical fluctuation in coal mine safety supervision is explained by evolutionary game.•Determining factors of supervising fluctuation are initial state and strategies’ payoffs.•Highly efficient government safety governance is necessary in developing countries.
Year
DOI
Venue
2015
10.1016/j.ejor.2014.12.046
European Journal of Operational Research
Keywords
DocType
Volume
OR in societal problem analysis,Evolutionary game,Government safety supervision,Periodical fluctuation,Coal mine accidents
Journal
243
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
3
0377-2217
3
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.44
10
4
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Dehai Liu151.85
Xingzhi Xiao230.44
Hongyi Li3138377.85
Weiguo Wang450.84