Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
I argue that if we make explicit the role of the user of scientific representations not only in the application but also in the construction of a model or representation, then inconsistent modeling assumptions do not pose an insurmountable obstacle to our representational practices. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1007/s11229-014-0471-9 | Synthese |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Inconsistency,Representation,Classical electrodynamics,Models | Classical electromagnetism,Obstacle,Artificial intelligence,Epistemology,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
191 | 13 | 0039-7857 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 0 |
Authors | ||
1 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Mathias Frisch | 1 | 0 | 0.68 |