Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
•Influential players may promote cooperation in evolutionary social dilemmas.•Influential players must be rare and weakly interconnected for cooperation to thrive.•Influential players enhance network reciprocity. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1016/j.amc.2014.10.044 | Applied Mathematics and Computation |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Evolutionary games,Networks,Cooperation,Social welfare,Spatial reciprocity | Mathematical optimization,Warrant,Microeconomics,Reciprocity (social psychology),Dilemma,Interconnectedness,Mathematics,Social Welfare | Journal |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
249 | 0096-3003 | 4 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.43 | 8 | 3 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Perc Matjaž | 1 | 570 | 58.27 |
| Otilija Petek | 2 | 4 | 0.43 |
| Salahuddin M. Kamal | 3 | 25 | 1.83 |