Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Motivated by a problem of scheduling unit-length jobs with weak preferences over time-slots, the random assignment problem is considered on a uniform preference domain. It is shown that the natural extension of the probabilistic serial mechanism to the domain of weak, but uniform, preferences fails strategy-proofness, but so does every other mechanism that is ordinally efficient and treats equals equally. If envy-free assignments are required, any ex-post efficient (probabilistic or deterministic) mechanism must fail even a weak form of strategy-proofness. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1016/j.orl.2015.02.010 | Operations Research Letters |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
random assignment,efficiency | Mathematical optimization,Scheduling (computing),Random assignment,Assignment problem,Probabilistic logic,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
abs/1412.6078 | 3 | 0167-6377 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 9 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Jay Sethuraman | 1 | 439 | 42.32 |
| Chun Ye | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |