Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We present a game-theoretic model for the spread of deviant behavior in online social networks. We utilize a two-strategy framework wherein each player's behavior is classified as normal or deviant and evolves according to the cooperate-defect payoff scheme of the classic prisoner's dilemma game. We demonstrate convergence of individual behavior over time to a final strategy vector and indicate counterexamples to this convergence outside the context of prisoner's dilemma. Theoretical results are validated on a real-world dataset collected from a popular online forum. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2014 | CoRR | Convergence (routing),Mathematical economics,Social network,Online forum,Deviance (sociology),Dilemma,Counterexample,Mathematics,Stochastic game |
DocType | Volume | Citations |
Journal | abs/1408.2770 | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.38 | 8 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sarah Michele Rajtmajer | 1 | 31 | 10.06 |
| Christopher Griffin | 2 | 137 | 46.28 |
| Derek Mikesell | 3 | 7 | 1.78 |
| Anna Cinzia Squicciarini | 4 | 1301 | 106.30 |