Paper Info
Title
A method to evaluate and compare evolutionarily stable strategies in fuzzy payoff games.
Abstract
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is a key concept in evolutionary game theory. ESS provides an evolutionary stability criterion for biological, social and economic behaviors. In this paper, a method is developed to evaluate ESS in symmetric two-person games with fuzzy payoffs. Every strategy is assigned a membership that describes to what extent it is an ESS. The fuzzy set of ESS can characterize the nature of ESS, and also gives a ranking of the stablest strategies. This method uses the satisfaction function to compare fuzzy payoffs, and adopts the fuzzy decision rule to obtain the membership function of the fuzzy ESS set. The relation between fuzzy ESS and fuzzy Nash equilibrium is also explored. In a symmetric two-person game, the fuzzy ESS set is a subset of the fuzzy symmetric Nash equilibrium set. The numeric results are congruous as expected, therefore this method to evaluate and compare ESSs is appropriate for fuzzy payoff games.
Year
Venue
DocType
2015
arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory
Journal
Volume
Citations 
PageRank 
abs/1501.04265
0
0.34
References 
Authors
0
1
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Haozhen Situ14310.96