Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
We consider envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules for problems where a number of indivisible objects and a fixed amount of money is allocated among a group of agents. In finite economies, we identify under classical preferences each agent’s maximal gain from manipulation. Using this result we find the envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rules which are least manipulable for each preference profile in terms of any agent’s maximal gain. If preferences are quasi-linear, then we can find an envy-free and budget-balanced allocation rule such that for any problem, the maximal utility gain from manipulation is equalized among all agents. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.01.006 | Mathematical Social Sciences |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Journal | 69 | 0165-4896 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
4 | 0.56 | 8 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Tommy Andersson | 1 | 4 | 0.56 |
| Lars Ehlers | 2 | 78 | 10.01 |
| Lars-Gunnar Svensson | 3 | 4 | 0.56 |