Paper Info
Title
Non-existence of subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \) -equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon.
Abstract
Every finite extensive-form game with perfect information has a subgame-perfect equilibrium. In this note we settle to the negative an open problem regarding the existence of a subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium in perfect information games with infinite horizon and Borel measurable payoffs, by providing a counter-example. We also consider a refinement called strong subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium, and show by means of another counter-example, with a simpler structure than the previous one, that a game may have no strong subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium for sufficiently small \(\varepsilon >0\), even though it admits a subgame-perfect \(\varepsilon \)-equilibrium for every \(\varepsilon >0\).
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1007/s00182-014-0412-3
Int. J. Game Theory
Keywords
DocType
Volume
Subgame-perfect equilibrium, Perfect-information games, Infinite horizon, Non-existence
Journal
43
Issue
ISSN
Citations 
4
1432-1270
0
PageRank 
References 
Authors
0.34
0
7
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
János Flesch110826.87
Jeroen Kuipers213014.48
Ayala Mashiah-Yaakovi3212.80
Gijs Schoenmakers4417.21
Eran Shmaya5346.95
Eilon Solan624140.21
Koos Vrieze7567.43