Paper Info
Title
Resilience Analysis of Power Grids Under the Sequential Attack
Abstract
The modern society increasingly relies on electrical service, which also brings risks of catastrophic consequences, e.g., large-scale blackouts. In the current literature, researchers reveal the vulnerability of power grids under the assumption that substations/transmission lines are removed or attacked synchronously. In reality, however, it is highly possible that such removals can be conducted sequentially. Motivated by this idea, we discover a new attack scenario, called the sequential attack, which assumes that substations/transmission lines can be removed sequentially, not synchronously. In particular, we find that the sequential attack can discover many combinations of substation whose failures can cause large blackout size. Previously, these combinations are ignored by the synchronous attack. In addition, we propose a new metric, called the sequential attack graph (SAG), and a practical attack strategy based on SAG. In simulations, we adopt three test benchmarks and five comparison schemes. Referring to simulation results and complexity analysis, we find that the proposed scheme has strong performance and low complexity.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1109/TIFS.2014.2363786
IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
Keywords
Field
DocType
cascading failures,power grid security,catastrophic consequences,power transmission lines,attack strategies,sequential attack graph,electrical service,power grids vulnerability,sequential attack,substations,power transmission reliability,power grids,resilience analysis,substation-transmission lines,complexity analysis
Psychological resilience,Computer security,Computer science,Electric power transmission,Blackout,Attack graph,Vulnerability
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
9
12
1556-6013
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
18
0.85
14
Authors
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Yihai Zhu119511.74
Jun Yan217913.72
Yufei Tang320322.83
Yan Lindsay Sun47510.41
Haibo He53653213.96