Title
Correcting Audience Externalities in Television Advertising.
Abstract
When a television advertisement causes viewers to switch channels, it reduces the audience available to subsequent advertisers. This audience loss is not reflected in the advertisement price, resulting in an audience externality. The present article analyzes the television network's problem of how to select, order, and price advertisements in a break of endogenous length in order to correct audience externalities. It proposes the Audience Value Maximization Algorithm (AVMA), which considers many possible advertisement orderings within a dynamic programming framework with a strategy-proof pricing mechanism. Two data sets are used to estimate heterogeneity in viewer-switching probabilities and advertiser willingness-to-pay parameters in order to evaluate the algorithm's performance. A series of simulations shows that AVMA typically maximizes audience value to advertisers, increases network revenue relative to several alternatives, and runs quickly enough to implement.
Year
DOI
Venue
2013
10.1287/mksc.2013.0807
MARKETING SCIENCE
Keywords
Field
DocType
advertising,advertising avoidance,media,television,pricing,externalities
Dynamic programming,Economics,Advertising,Microeconomics,Communication channel,Common value auction,Externality,Network revenue,Marketing,Maximization
Journal
Volume
Issue
ISSN
32
6
0732-2399
Citations 
PageRank 
References 
6
0.66
11
Authors
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Kenneth C. Wilbur160.66
Linli Xu279042.51
David Kempe35891403.41