Name
Title | ||
|---|---|---|
Strategy-Proofness Makes the Difference: Deferred-Acceptance with Responsive Priorities. |
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
In college admissions and student placements at public schools, the admission decision can be thought of as assigning indivisible objects with capacity constraints to a set of students such that each student receives at most one object and monetary compensations are not allowed. In these important market design problems, the agent-proposing deferred-acceptance (DA) mechanism with responsive strict priorities performs well, and economists have successfully implemented DA-mechanisms or slight variants thereof. We show that almost all real-life mechanisms used in such environments-including the large classes of priority mechanisms and linear programming mechanisms-satisfy a set of simple and intuitive properties. Once we add strategy-proofness to these properties, DA-mechanisms are the only ones surviving. In market design problems that are based on weak priorities (like school choice), generally multiple tie-breaking (MTB) procedures are used and then a mechanism is implemented with the obtained strict priorities. By adding stability with respect to the weak priorities, we establish the first normative foundation for MTB-DA-mechanisms that are used in New York City. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1287/moor.2014.0662 | MATHEMATICS OF OPERATIONS RESEARCH |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
deferred-acceptance mechanism,indivisible objects allocation,multiple tie-breaking,school choice,strategy-proofness | School choice,Normative,Microeconomics,Linear programming,Operations management,Mathematics | Journal |
Volume | Issue | ISSN |
39 | 4 | 0364-765X |
Citations | PageRank | References |
2 | 0.52 | 4 |
Authors | ||
2 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lars Ehlers | 1 | 78 | 10.01 |
| Bettina Klaus | 2 | 2 | 0.85 |