Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
•A real security game is represented as a shortest-path game using a Lyapunov theory.•The problem of finding pure and mixed strategies became computationally tractable.•We introduce a joint c-variable to reformulate the problem as linear programming.•We provide a method for constructing a Lyapunov-like function.•We prove that the convergence of the method to a strong equilibrium is exponential. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2015 | 10.1016/j.eswa.2014.12.034 | Expert Systems with Applications |
Keywords | DocType | Volume |
Security games,Strong Stackelberg equilibrium,Shortest-path games,Lyapunov equilibrium,Lyapunov games,Complexity analysis,Repeated Markov games | Journal | 42 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
8 | 0957-4174 | 5 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.46 | 35 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Julio B. Clempner | 1 | 91 | 20.11 |
| Alexander S. Poznyak | 2 | 22 | 2.52 |