Abstract | ||
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AbstractIn cognitive radio networks, the most important goal of spectrum sharing is to benefit both the seller and buyer. In order to increase the total benefits generated in spectrum sharing, this paper introduces a memory mechanism between the spectrum agent and multi-primary service providers PSPs and proposes a spectrum trading algorithm based on the mechanism. In this algorithm, all PSPs compete with each other and sell their idle spectrum resource to the agent to maximise their own profits. Then, the agent auctions the spectrum resources obtained in multi-secondary users. Finally, a new auction pricing function is designed to decrease the auction trading prices and increase the benefits of secondary users. Nash equilibrium is considered to be the optimal result. Simulation results show that the proposed algorithm provides 10-15% margin over the conventional algorithm both in the price and spectrum quantity. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2015 | 10.1002/ett.2830 | Periodicals |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Idle,Computer science,Algorithm,Spectrum trading,Service provider,Common value auction,Nash equilibrium,Spectrum sharing,Profit (economics),Cognitive radio | Journal | 26 |
Issue | ISSN | Citations |
2 | 2161-3915 | 0 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 22 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Shibing Zhang | 1 | 4 | 2.42 |
Guodong Zhang | 2 | 0 | 0.34 |
Zhihua Bao | 3 | 44 | 10.32 |
Xiaoge Zhang | 4 | 0 | 0.34 |