Abstract | ||
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Non-cooperative dialogue behaviour for artificial agents (e.g. deception and information hiding) has been identified as important in a variety of application areas, including education and healthcare, but it has not yet been addressed using modern statistical approaches to dialogue agents. Deception has also been argued to be a requirement for high-order intentionality in AI. We develop and evaluate a statistical dialogue agent using Reinforcement Learning which learns to perform non-cooperative dialogue moves in order to complete its own objectives in a stochastic trading game with imperfect information. We show that, when given the ability to perform both cooperative and non-cooperative dialogue moves, such an agent can learn to bluff and to lie so as to win more games. For example, we show that a non-cooperative dialogue agent learns to win 10.5% more games than a strong rule-based adversary, when compared to an optimised agent which cannot perform non-cooperative moves. This work is the first to show how agents can learn to use dialogue in a non-cooperative way to meet their own goals. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2014 | 10.3233/978-1-61499-419-0-999 | Frontiers in Artificial Intelligence and Applications |
Field | DocType | Volume |
Bluff,Intentionality,Computer science,Deception,Information hiding,Artificial intelligence,Adversary,Perfect information,Machine learning,Reinforcement learning | Conference | 263 |
ISSN | Citations | PageRank |
0922-6389 | 0 | 0.34 |
References | Authors | |
3 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Ioannis Efstathiou | 1 | 15 | 2.12 |
Oliver Lemon | 2 | 1072 | 86.38 |