Abstract | ||
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We show key recovery attacks on generic balanced Feistel ciphers. The analysis is based on the meet-in-the-middle technique and exploits truncated differentials that are present in the ciphers due to the Feistel construction. Depending on the type of round function, we differentiate and show attacks on two types of Feistels. For the first type, which is the most general Feistel, we show a 5-round distinguisher (based on a truncated differential), which allows to launch 6-round and 10-round attacks, for single-key and double-key sizes, respectively. For the second type, we assume the round function follows the SPN structure with a linear layer P that has a maximal branch number, and based on a 7-round distinguisher, we show attacks that reach up to 14 rounds. Our attacks outperform all the known attacks for any key sizes, have been experimentally verified (implemented on a regular PC), and provide new lower bounds on the number of rounds required to achieve a practical and a secure Feistel. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2014 | 10.1007/978-3-662-45611-8_24 | ADVANCES IN CRYPTOLOGY - ASIACRYPT 2014, PT I |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Feistel,generic attack,key recovery,meet-in-the-middle | Discrete mathematics,Differential (mechanical device),Round function,Key schedule,Block cipher,Computer science,Branch number,Exploit,Theoretical computer science,Meet in the middle,Key recovery | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
8873 | 0302-9743 | 3 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.39 | 16 | 4 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
Jian Guo | 1 | 294 | 24.22 |
Jérémy Jean | 2 | 242 | 17.82 |
Ivica Nikolic | 3 | 170 | 18.14 |
Yu Sasaki | 4 | 247 | 15.33 |