Paper Info
Title
Approximate Pure Nash Equilibria In Social Context Congestion Games
Abstract
We study the existence of approximate pure Nash equilibria in social context congestion games. For any given set of allowed cost functions F, we provide a threshold value mu(F), and show that for the class of social context congestion games with cost functions from F, alpha-Nash dynamics are guaranteed to converge to alpha-approximate pure Nash equilibrium if and only if alpha > mu(F).Interestingly, mu(F) is related and always upper bounded by Roughgarden's anarchy value [19].
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1007/978-3-319-13129-0_43
WEB AND INTERNET ECONOMICS
Field
DocType
Volume
Mathematical optimization,Congestion game,Mathematical economics,Epsilon-equilibrium,Potential game,Computer science,Price of stability,Best response,Nash equilibrium
Conference
8877
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
0302-9743
0
0.34
References 
Authors
13
3
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Martin Gairing163347.14
Grammateia Kotsialou291.84
Alexander Skopalik324720.62