Abstract | ||
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In this work, we describe how to realize rational cryptographic protocols in practice from abstract game specifications. Existing work requires strong assumptions about communication resources in order to preserve equilibria between game descriptions and realized protocols. We argue that for real world protocols, it must be assumed that players have access to point-to-point communication channels. Thus, allowing signaling and strategy correlation becomes unavoidable. We argue that ideal world game descriptions of realizable protocols should include such communication resources as well, in order to facilitate the design of protocols in the real world. Our results specify a modified ideal and real world model that account for the presence of point-to-point communication channels between players, where security is achieved through the simulation paradigm. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
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2014 | 10.1007/978-3-319-12601-2_8 | DECISION AND GAME THEORY FOR SECURITY, GAMESEC 2014 |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
Rational Multiparty Computation, Game Theory, Non-Cooperative Computation | Cryptographic protocol,Computer science,Communication channel,Game theory,Distributed computing | Conference |
Volume | ISSN | Citations |
8840 | 0302-9743 | 1 |
PageRank | References | Authors |
0.34 | 25 | 2 |
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
---|---|---|---|
John Ross Wallrabenstein | 1 | 12 | 2.20 |
Chris Clifton | 2 | 3327 | 544.44 |