Title
A combinatorial double auction mechanism for cloud resource group-buying
Abstract
With the development of cloud computing, there is an increasing number of market-based mechanisms for cloud resource allocation. Inspired by the emerging group-buying Web sites, we advocate that group-buying can be applied to cloud resource allocation, and thus cloud providers can benefit from demand aggregation due to the advantage of group-buying in attracting customers, while cloud users can enjoy lower price. However, none of the existing allocation mechanisms is specifically designed for the scenario with group-buying, and it is a challenge for mechanism design to take full advantage of group-buying to maximize the total utility. In this paper, we fill this gap by proposing an innovative auction mechanism. The mechanism is designed based on a combinatorial double auction, in which the allocation algorithm and payment scheme are specifically designed to efficiently generate allocation and compute prices considering group-buying. We theoretically prove that the necessary economic properties in auction design, such as individual rationality, budget balance and truthfulness, are satisfied in our work. The experiments show that the proposed mechanism yields higher total utility, and has good scalability.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1109/PCCC.2014.7017104
IPCCC
Keywords
Field
DocType
price computation,payment scheme,vm allocation,market-based mechanism,rationality,cloud resource group-buying,demand aggregation,virtual machine,truthfulness,virtual machines,cloud providers,budget balance,greedy algorithm,combinatorial mathematics,resource allocation,cloud users,group-buying web sites,mechanism scalability,group-buying,cloud computing development,combinatorial double auction,cloud resource allocation,combinatorial double-auction mechanism,total utility maximization,electronic commerce,vm,cloud computing,economic properties,auction design,cost accounting,economics,resource management,computational modeling,algorithm design and analysis
Resource management,Mathematical optimization,Computer science,Simulation,Computer network,Mechanism design,Resource allocation,Group buying,Auction algorithm,Double auction,Cloud computing,Scalability
Conference
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
1097-2641
6
0.43
References 
Authors
11
5
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Zehao Sun1194.07
Zhenyu Zhu291.89
Long Chen38516.11
Hongli Xu450285.92
Liusheng Huang51082123.52