Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Motivated by real-time advertising exchanges, we analyze the problem of pricing inventory in a repeated posted-price auction. We consider both the cases of a truthful and surplus-maximizing buyer, where the former makes decisions myopically on every round, and the latter may strategically react to our algorithm, forgoing short-term surplus in order to trick the algorithm into setting better prices in the future. We further assume a buyer's valuation of a good is a function of a context vector that describes the good being sold. We give the first algorithm attaining sublinear ((O) over tilde (T-2/3)) regret in the contextual setting against a surplus-maximizing buyer. We also extend this result to repeated second-price auctions with multiple buyers. |
Year | Venue | Field |
|---|---|---|
2014 | ADVANCES IN NEURAL INFORMATION PROCESSING SYSTEMS 27 (NIPS 2014) | Sublinear function,Mathematical economics,Mathematical optimization,Regret,Computer science,Common value auction,Valuation (finance) |
DocType | Volume | ISSN |
Conference | 27 | 1049-5258 |
Citations | PageRank | References |
18 | 0.80 | 14 |
Authors | ||
3 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| Kareem Amin | 1 | 26 | 1.37 |
| Afshin Rostamizadeh | 2 | 911 | 44.15 |
| Umar Syed | 3 | 259 | 18.34 |