Paper Info
Title
Partner-recruitment: Incentive mechanism for content offloading
Abstract
Cooperative content offloading is a promising technology to lessen heavy burden of wireless networks and improve the quality of downloading services. Since few users are voluntary in providing free assistance, auction-based incentive mechanisms are designed to encourage participation. In existing auction-based incentive mechanisms, each provider only acts as a service seller. However, a provider could also be a partner of the requestor if having interest in the requested content. This dual identity of the provider can improve the quality of its service and cut down the payment of requestor. Based on this observation, we propose an auction-based incentive mechanism named CADRE. To the best of our knowledge, CADRE is the first auction-based incentive mechanism that considers the provider's dual identity in cooperative content offloading applications. We prove that CADRE possesses attractive characteristics, i.e., truthfulness, lightweight and privacy protection. Besides, we also demonstrate that CADRE outperforms the traditional multi-attribute second-score sealed reverse auction. Our simulation results verify the theoretical analysis.
Year
DOI
Venue
2014
10.1109/ICC.2014.6883705
ICC
Keywords
Field
DocType
quality of downloading services,cooperative communication,quality of service,free assistance auction-based incentive mechanisms,wireless networks,incentive schemes,radio networks,cadre,service seller,cooperative content offloading,multiattribute second-score sealed reverse auction,provider dual identity,partner-recruitment,privacy protection
Internet privacy,Incentive,Computer security,Computer science,Computer network
Conference
ISSN
Citations 
PageRank 
1550-3607
0
0.34
References 
Authors
9
6
Name
Order
Citations
PageRank
Xiao Chen141.11
Shengling Wang231237.32
Min Liu333540.49
Chao Huang45417.39
Yaqin Zhou5303.32
Zhongcheng Li639041.99