Name
Abstract | ||
|---|---|---|
Implementation attacks are a major threat to hardware cryptographic implementations. These attacks exploit the correlation existing between the computed data and variables such as computation time, consumed power, and electromagnetic (EM) emissions. Recently, the EM channel has been proven as an effective passive and active attack technique against secure implementations. In this paper, we resume the recent results obtained on this subject, with a particular focus on EM as a fault injection tool. |
Year | DOI | Venue |
|---|---|---|
2014 | 10.1109/VLSI-SoC.2014.7004182 | Very Large Scale Integration |
Keywords | Field | DocType |
cryptography,electromagnetic compatibility,fault diagnosis,network analysis,EM emissions,active attack technique,electromagnetic analysis,electromagnetic emissions,fault injection tool,hardware cryptography,implementation attacks,secure circuits,EM,Fault Attacks,Secure implementations,Side Channel Analysis | Communication channel,Implementation,Exploit,Engineering,Electronic circuit,Fault injection,Cryptographic implementations,Embedded system,Differential fault analysis,Computation | Conference |
Citations | PageRank | References |
0 | 0.34 | 10 |
Authors | ||
4 | ||
Name | Order | Citations | PageRank |
|---|---|---|---|
| P. Maistri | 1 | 200 | 11.98 |
| regis leveugle | 2 | 370 | 32.01 |
| Bossuet, L. | 3 | 11 | 1.32 |
| Aubert, A. | 4 | 0 | 0.34 |